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669 
Note 
 
Jurisprudential Innovation or Accountability 
Avoidance? The International Criminal Court 
and Proposed Expansion of the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights 
Kristen Rau∗
Atrocities of an international scale are nothing new.
 
1 From 
Carthage and Armenia to Rwanda and Iraq, the history of hu-
mankind features innumerable instances of horrific bloodshed.2 
Internationally-led individual criminal accountability for hu-
man rights abuses, by contrast, is a modern development. The 
Nuremburg trials marked the earliest manifestation of interna-
tional criminal proceedings, which have continued to evolve 
with the establishment of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC).3
Given that Africa has a long history of human rights viola-
tions and that all seven of the ICC’s current active investiga-
 Despite this changing face of international justice, the 
controversy surrounding its utility—and whether it promotes 
or compromises peace—is ongoing. 
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Keppler of Human Rights Watch; Professor Duane Krohnke; Foreign, Com-
parative & International Law Librarian Mary Rumsey; Professor Kathryn 
Sikkink; and Professor David Weissbrodt for their insightful comments and 
edits. In addition, the author expresses thanks to Robert and Susan Rau for 
their support. All errors herein are the author’s own. Copyright © 2012 by 
Kristen Rau. 
 1. See generally BEN KIERNAN, BLOOD AND SOIL: A WORLD HISTORY OF 
GENOCIDE AND EXTERMINATION FROM SPARTA TO DARFUR 1–40 (2007) (provid-
ing an introductory survey of human rights abuses throughout history). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Hon. Philippe Kirsch, President, Int’l Criminal Court, Keynote Ad-
dress at the Judgment at Nuremberg Conference: Applying the Principles of 
Nuremberg in the ICC (Sept. 30, 2006), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ED2F5177-9F9B-4D66-9386-5C5BF45D052C/146323/ 
PK_20060930_English.pdf. 
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tions are situated on that continent,4 it is unsurprising that Af-
rican actors are vocal on international justice issues. It is 
equally unsurprising that an African institution and its pro-
posed expansion demonstrate the legal and political tradeoffs of 
international justice efforts. The African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights (ACJHR), a regional tribunal proposed by mem-
ber states of the African Union (AU), is particularly controver-
sial due to the uncertainty of its potential interaction with the 
ICC.5 The ACJHR, as initially planned, merges two previous 
regional courts into a single institution, combining judicial 
functions related to state-level human rights violations and 
treaty interpretation law.6
Expansion of the court beyond that initial grant concerns 
observers for several reasons. First, the proposed expansion of 
the court would create the world’s first combined state-level 
and individual-level criminal accountability mechanism for 
human rights violations on an international scale.
  
7 Interna-
tional criminal law and human rights law have long coexisted 
in a bifurcated system of accountability, and observers fear that 
their conflation is undesirable.8 Second, and perhaps more 
problematically, expansion of the ACJHR would produce an ar-
ea of overlapping jurisdiction between the court and the ICC 
not contemplated by either court’s foundational document and 
not definitively addressed in treaty interpretation law.9
This Note investigates the ways in which modern develop-
ments in international criminal law interact with both long-
standing and novel accountability institutions—specifically, 
how proposed expansion of the ACJHR would relate to existing 
systems of state- and individual-level accountability for human 
rights abuses. Part I offers an overview of global judicial hu-
 
 
 4. Karen L. Corrie, International Criminal Law, 46 INT’L LAW. 145, 151 
(2012). 
 5. See Observations and Recommendations on the International Criminal 
Court and the African Union, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 27, 2011), http://www 
.hrw.org/node/99945. 
 6. African Union, Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice 
and Human Rights, art. 1 (July 1, 2008) [hereinafter ACJHR Protocol], avail-
able at http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/documents/treaties/text/Protocol% 
20on%20the%20Merged%20Court%20-%20EN.pdf. 
 7. See Kathryn Sikkink, From State Responsibility to Individual Crimi-
nal Accountability: A New Regulatory Model for Core Human Rights Viola-
tions, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION 121, 121–26 (Walter Mattli & 
Ngaire Woods eds., 2009). 
 8. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 9. See infra Part II.B.1. 
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man rights mechanisms, including the ICC and the ACJHR, 
and discusses efforts to expand the latter’s jurisdiction. Part II 
examines legal issues related to expanding the ACJHR’s juris-
diction, considers policy barriers to effectively prosecuting hu-
man rights abusers within the expanded jurisdictional scope, 
and considers these challenges in light of potential benefits to 
expansion. Part III suggests approaches through which stake-
holders could address various procedural and practical difficul-
ties should the AU pursue expansion. Ultimately, this Note 
predicts that the ACJHR may well expand as the result of ju-
risprudential evolution and political will, suggesting that 
stakeholders should recognize the potential benefits to expan-
sion and develop benchmarks to ensure the court’s integrity 
and effectiveness. 
I.  ALPHABET SOUP: AN OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL 
COURTS AND KEY PRINCIPLES   
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS COURTS AND 
THE EMERGENCE OF BIFURCATION 
Modern human rights courts exist in a bifurcated judicial 
system.10 That is, international courts and the nature of the 
cases they hear vary widely depending upon a particular tribu-
nal’s mandate to consider state- or individual-level human 
rights claims.11
In 1945, the field of human rights was basically unregulat-
ed; by 2000, states had ratified a panoply of human rights trea-
ties and conventions, laying the groundwork for international 
courts.
 A brief history of these courts helps to contex-
tualize the ACJHR and its proposed jurisdictional expansion.  
12
 
 10. See generally KATHRYN SIKKINK, THE JUSTICE CASCADE: HOW HUMAN 
RIGHTS PROSECUTIONS ARE CHANGING WORLD POLITICS 13–24 (2011). 
 In early regional human rights courts in Europe and 
the Americas, the legal regulatory model focused only on states’ 
 11. See Sikkink, supra note 7, at 121–37 (examining the emergence of 
state and individual accountability systems). 
 12. See id. Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms was adopted in November 1950, the American Con-
vention on Human Rights was adopted in November 1969, and Africa’s Banjul 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights was adopted in June 1981. Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 
213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention]; American Convention on 
Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinaf-
ter Inter-American Convention]; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217. 
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legal accountability for human rights violations.13 On the one 
hand, then, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) hold ac-
countable states whose action or inaction violates their resi-
dents’ human rights in contravention of states’ treaty obliga-
tions; these courts rule on the basis of human rights law 
promulgated in the European Convention of Human Rights and 
the American Convention on Human Rights, respectively.14 
Similarly, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) decides ques-
tions of state-level violations under European Union (EU) law.15 
The United Nations’ primary judicial organ, the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ), also considers state-level human rights 
claims.16 While the respective spheres of authority of these 
courts relative to the others are not always clear, it is plain 
that these courts consider only claims regarding state-level ac-
countability, rather than individual criminal accountability.17
On the other hand, more recently formed ad hoc interna-
tional criminal justice bodies like the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the permanent ICC 
seek to hold individuals responsible, leaving state accountabil-
ity outside their legal competence.
 
18 The ICC is perhaps the 
most significant of these individual-level courts given its per-
manent status.19 The ICC has a mandate to hold accountable 
perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the inter-
national community.20
 
 13. Sikkink, supra note 
 As an independent international organi-
zation (i.e., it does not operate as a direct part of the United 
7, at 121. 
 14. Inter-American Convention, supra note 12, at arts. 61, 62; European 
Convention, supra note 12, at art. 32. 
 15. See generally Court of Justice of the European Union, EUROPA, 
http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/court-justice/index_en.htm (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2012). 
 16. See generally Rosalyn Higgins, Human Rights in the International 
Court of Justice, 20 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 745, 745–75 (2007).  
 17. See generally YUVAL SHANY, THE COMPETING JURISDICTIONS OF IN-
TERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (2003). 
 18. See Sikkink, supra note 7, at 134 for a discussion of key legal devel-
opments facilitating the evolution of an individual criminal accountability 
model alongside state-level proceedings.  
 19. About the Court, INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/ 
About+the+Court/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2012). 
 20. Id. The ICC’s jurisdiction is limited to genocide, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity, referred to in this Note as “serious international 
crimes.” This Note does not discuss the crime of aggression. 
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Nations’ system), the ICC’s expenses are primarily funded by 
members of its Assembly of States Parties (ASP).21 Since its 
underlying Rome Statute entered into force on July 17, 1998,22 
the ICC has been at the center of robust debate about the utili-
ty and effectiveness of international justice mechanisms.23 The 
Court concluded its first criminal trial of Thomas Lubanga in 
August 2011.24 From its seat in The Hague, the ICC found the 
former Congolese warlord guilty of using child soldiers in his 
rebel army in 2002 and 2003, and sentenced him to fourteen 
years in prison.25 The ICC reflects the increasingly prominent 
individual criminal accountability paradigm, separate from 
that aimed at state-level accountability. Indeed, observers con-
sider the ICC’s underlying Rome Statute as “the clearest 
statement of the new doctrine of individual criminal accounta-
bility.”26
These courts—the ICTY, the ICTR, and the ICC—are the 
product of work by human rights organizations, legal scholars, 
and governments to facilitate the development of the individual 
criminal accountability model through treaty language explicit-
ly referring to individual offenders.
  
27 While the newer individu-
al accountability model does reflect “an important convergence 
[of several branches] of international law (human rights, hu-
manitarian, and international criminal law) and domestic crim-
inal law,”28
 
 21. See Gwen P. Barnes, The International Criminal Court’s Ineffective 
Enforcement Mechanisms: The Indictment of President Omar Al Bashir, 34 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1584, 1593 (2011) (observing that the ICC is independent 
from the UN). 
 it operates strictly independent of the state-level 
 22. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 23. For a discussion of the United States’ concerns about the ICC, see Wil-
liam A. Schabas, United States Hostility to the International Criminal Court: 
It’s All About the Security Council, 15 EUR. J. INT’L LAW 701, 701 (2004). 
 24. Aaron Gray-Block, ICC’s Landmark Debut Trial Concludes After Two 
Years, REUTERS (Aug. 24, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/24/us-
warcrimes-lubanga-idUSTRE77N32N20110824. 
 25. Marlise Simons, Congolese Warlord Draws First Sentence From Inter-
national Criminal Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 11, 2012, at A4. 
 26. Sikkink, supra note 7, at 136. 
 27. Id. at 134 (“The drafters of various treaties, especially the Genocide 
Convention of 1948 and the Convention against Torture (CAT) negotiated in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, managed to insert clear references to individu-
al criminal accountability. These treaties did not create a new legal framework 
all at once, but rather contributed gradually and in an understated way to the 
development of the new norms.”). 
 28. Id. at 137. 
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model. Indeed, mechanisms for state-level violations and indi-
vidual criminal accountability evolved during different periods 
and emerged for different historical reasons.29 The state ac-
countability model emerged alongside key treaties such as the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
as well as a proliferation of non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and regional and international institutions overseeing 
compliance with those treaties.30 These treaties and organiza-
tions emphasized states’ responsibility to protect human rights 
and to investigate abuses of those rights.31 By contrast, the in-
dividual model ascended in the context of the Balkan conflict 
and the Rwandan genocide, vivid illustrations that the domi-
nant state-regulatory model had failed.32 The individual model 
“may have emerged as a way to provide additional enforcement 
mechanisms for the human rights regime in the wake of the 
perception that the current enforcement mechanisms were in-
adequate and new tools were needed.”33
B. EVOLVING JURISDICTIONAL PARADIGMS: CONCURRENCE TO 
COMPLEMENTARITY  
 
Along with navigating the complexities of bifurcation out-
lined above, one of the thorniest challenges for promoting long-
term peace in conflict states through judicial mechanisms is the 
institutional relationship between international and domestic 
 
 29. Juan Méndez, Background Paper for Panel on Regional Organs of Pro-
tection, CONSULTATIVE CONF. ON INT’L CRIM. JUST., 2 (Sept. 9–11, 2009), 
http://www.internationalcriminaljustice.net/experience/papers/session5.pdf. 
 30. Sikkink, supra note 7, at 123. The ICCPR, which entered into force in 
1976, was the first U.N. multilateral treaty obligating states parties to respect 
various enumerated rights of their citizens. International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, adopted by the General Assembly Dec. 19, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 31. See Rhonda Copelon, International Human Rights Dimensions of In-
timate Violence: Another Strand in the Dialectic of Feminist Lawmaking, 11 
AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 865, 872 (2003) (“The ICCPR identifies two 
concepts of state responsibility: the duty to respect (negative) or do no harm 
and the duty to ensure (positive) the protection of these rights as against pri-
vate interference as well as the means to exercise basic rights.”). 
 32. Sikkink, supra note 7, at 124. 
 33. Id. But see BEATRICE I. BONAFÈ, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE 
AND INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 35 (2009) (“In 
the less recent scholarship, the two regimes of international responsibility 
were viewed as closely connected to each other. However, a gradual process of 
separation took place until the rapid development of international criminal 
law in the 1990s brought to the surface various practical issues concerning 
their relationship.”). 
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courts. The earliest ad hoc courts, such as the ICTY and the 
ICTR, operated according to a principle of concurrent jurisdic-
tion.34 Effectively, this principle bestowed on international 
courts the primary responsibility for investigating and prose-
cuting human rights abuses.35 According to their underlying 
statutes, “[a]t any stage of the procedure, the International 
Tribunal may formally request national courts to defer to the 
competence of the International Tribunal in accordance with 
the present Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of 
the International Tribunal.”36 These international courts oper-
ated with precedence over the national courts; that is, these in-
ternational courts were able to proceed with investigations and 
prosecutions without determining that a domestic court had 
failed to investigate or prosecute human rights violations.37 
Cognizant of the decimation of judicial systems of the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, drafters established primacy of the in-
ternational courts in order to deal with hotly contested issues 
in a more neutral and developed judicial environment.38
Unlike the ICTY and ICTR, which enjoyed jurisdiction in 
effect superior to national courts, the ICC operates according to 
a principle of complementarity.
 
39
 
 34. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 348–51 (2003). 
 In a complementary relation-
ship, as between the ICC and a domestic court, the former may 
only step in where the latter is “unwilling or unable genuinely 
 35. Id. In fact, the international tribunals could assert primacy in three 
circumstances: when a national prosecutor investigated an international 
crime, or a national court held criminal proceedings relating to that crime, as 
an ‘ordinary’ and not an international crime; when a domestic court acted un-
reliably by showing partiality or dependence; or when the case was “closely 
related to” other cases under consideration by the international tribunal. Id. at 
349–50; see also ICTY, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 8-9, U.N. Doc. 
IT/32/Rev. 46 (Oct. 20, 2011); ICTR, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 8-9, 
U.N. Doc. ITR/3/Rev. 1 (June 29, 1995); John T. Holmes, Complementarity: 
National Courts versus the ICC, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATION-
AL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 667 (Antonio Cassese et al., eds., 2002). 
 36. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Com-
mitted in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, art. 9, U.N. Doc. 
S/25704 (May 3, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; see also Statute of the In-
ternational Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) 
[hereinafter ICTR Statute]. 
 37. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COM-
MENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE 52 (2010). 
 38. See CASSESE, supra note 34, at 349 (exploring the ways in which the 
post-conflict context of Yugoslavia and Rwanda produced “the need . . . to af-
firm the overriding authority of the international Tribunal”). 
 39. CASSESE, supra note 34, at 351. 
  
676 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [97:669 
 
to carry out the investigation or prosecution.”40 The historical 
context in which the ICC emerged is significant: the Interna-
tional Law Commission’s preparation of the ICC draft statute 
took place during its 1993 and 1994 sessions, after creation of 
the ICTY and while the Security Council was concerned with 
the Rwandan genocide.41 Drafters recognized both the need for 
a permanent criminal court and states parties’ potential reluc-
tance to sacrifice a role for their domestic courts in the investi-
gation or prosecution of suspected human rights crimes.42 The 
Rome Statute’s inclusion of a complementarity approach, ra-
ther than a concurrency or primacy principle, recognized state 
sovereignty and sought to manage scarce ICC resources.43 
Moreover, it signified an important and delicately negotiated 
balance of state authority and international intolerance for im-
punity.44
While these examples reflect a notable difference between 
earlier tribunals and the ICC, the underlying statutes of all of 
these courts feature a striking similarity: in determining the 
ways in which they would interact with other courts (i.e., the 
operationalization of their concurrent or complementary juris-
dictional grant) all three courts contemplated only domestic 
courts.
  
45 The drafters of these courts did not consider regional 
courts, such as the ACJHR, that might assert a shared jurisdic-
tional interest.46
The novelty of the problem presented by potential ACJHR 
expansion is revealed by a brief hypothetical comparison to the 
ICTY. Although this situation has not presented itself, the 
ICTY and the ICC conceivably could have overlapped jurisdic-
tionally with regard to human rights abuses committed after 
2002—a time still within the ICTY’s open-ended temporal ju-
risdiction, yet after the Rome Statute’s entry into force.
 The absence of relevant statutory language is 
significant, as it leaves current international tribunals with lit-
tle guidance on how they might interact with regional courts.  
47
 
 40. Rome Statute, supra note 
 The 
22, at art. 17. An integral component of the 
complementarity requirement concerns the point at which domestic proceed-
ings are considered “unwilling or unable genuinely” to conduct an investiga-
tion or trial. 
 41. Holmes, supra note 35, at 670. 
 42. See CASSESE, supra note 34, at 351–52. 
 43. Id. at 351. 
 44. See id. at 351–53. 
 45. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 46. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 47. Michael Bohlander, Possible Conflicts of Jurisdiction with the Ad Hoc 
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ICTY emerged pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter,48 
meaning that all U.N. members are bound to their obligations 
to the tribunal above all other treaties and conventions, includ-
ing the Rome Statute.49 By contrast, the Rome Statute devel-
oped independently from U.N. membership, and its signatories 
did not assume any obligations paramount to the United Na-
tions or its ad hoc courts.50 Because of its rooting in the U.N. 
Charter, the ICTY’s authority would inherently have overruled 
that of the ICC.51 The superior-subordinate relationship be-
tween the ICTY and ICC, though complicated and never pre-
sented, is a clear one.52
By contrast, states parties to the Rome Statute would not 
necessarily have a dominant obligation to the ICC over a re-
gional court. This fact highlights the novelty of the issue posed 
by potential jurisdictional expansion of the ACJHR in the con-
text of the ICC: while the nature of past international tribunals 
(e.g., the ICTY) inherently vested them with superior authority 
to the ICC, such is not the case with the ACJHR and its pro-
posed expansion. Identifying those portions of a shared legal 
territory that would attach to the ICC and those that would at-
tach to a jurisdictionally expanded ACJHR would not be 
straightforward.
  
53
C. A TIMELINE OF PAN-AFRICAN COURTS 
 Indeed, the absence of statutory guidance 
that would resolve conflicts relating to overlapping jurisdiction 
may lead to real legal conflict given the political and regional 
interests existing at the intersection of international justice 
and human rights. 
The ACJHR constitutes a significant reorganization of 
uniquely African justice mechanisms, a brief history of which is 
 
International Tribunals, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIM-
INAL COURT: A COMMENTARY, supra note 35, at 687–89. 
 48. ICTY Statute, supra note 36, at chapeau (“Having been established by 
the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations . . . [the ICTY] shall function in accordance with the provisions of the 
present Statute.”). 
 49. Bohlander, supra note 47, at 688. 
 50. Rome Statute, supra note 22, at art. 2 (noting that the ICC did not 
emerge pursuant to U.N. authority and that any relationship with the United 
Nations would exist by agreement only). 
 51. See id. 
 52. See Bohlander, supra note 47, at 688 (explaining that the ICTY’s ju-
risdiction would prevail over the ICC’s). 
 53. See infra Part II.B.1. 
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useful.54 The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(ACHPR) was established in 1998 with jurisdiction over all 
members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), precursor 
to the AU.55 Drafters vested the ACHPR with authority over 
“all cases and disputes . . . concerning the interpretation and 
application of the [OAU] Charter, this Protocol and any other 
relevant Human Rights instrument ratified by the States con-
cerned.”56 In 2003, the AU adopted a protocol establishing the 
organization’s principal judicial organ, the African Court of 
Justice (ACJ), a second court with jurisdiction over all disputes 
related to treaty interpretation and international law.57 These 
two original courts, the ACHPR and the ACJ, featured non-
overlapping jurisdiction. While the former considered state-
level human rights issues, the latter was to address disputes 
relating to general questions of international law, the validity 
of AU treaties and subsidiary legal instruments, and acts, regu-
lations, and directives of AU organs.58
AU leaders proposed the ACJHR in 2008, seeking to con-
solidate the two previous courts and merge their respective 
functions into a single institution.
 
59 As initially proposed, the 
ACJHR would act as a dual-chamber court comprised of a Gen-
eral Affairs and a Human Rights Section.60 The ACJHR will 
have sixteen judges, each appointed by a different state, with 
three to four judges allotted to each region.61
 
 54. This Note focuses primarily on Pan-African courts (i.e., continent-wide 
structures) rather than on regional or sub-regional courts. 
 As initially pro-
 55. See generally Nsongurua J. Udombana, Toward the African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights: Better Late Than Never, 3 YALE HUM. RTS. & 
DEV. L.J. 45 (2000). 
 56. Organization of African Unity, Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Hu-
man and Peoples’ Rights, art. 3, CAB/LEG/665 (June 9, 1998), available at 
http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/courtestablishment/achpr_instr_proto_
court_eng.pdf (entered into force Jan. 1, 2004). 
 57. Compare id. at art. 3, with African Union, Protocol of the Court of Jus-
tice of the African Union, arts. 2(2), 19(1) (July 11, 2003) [hereinafter ACJ 
Protocol], available at http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/PROTOCOL_ 
COURT_OF_JUSTICE_OF_THE_AFRICAN_UNION.pdf (entered into force 
Feb. 11, 2009). 
 58. ACJ Protocol, supra note 57, at art. 19(1).  
 59. ACJHR Protocol, supra note 6, at art. 2.  
 60. African Union, Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights, arts. 1, 16 (July 1, 2008) [hereinafter ACJHR Statute], available at 
http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/documents/treaties/text/Protocol%20on% 
20the%20Merged%20Court%20-%20EN.pdf. 
 61. Id. at art. 3. 
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posed, the ACJHR would be capable of hearing only two types 
of cases: state-level accountability cases “relating to human 
and/or [peoples’] rights” and cases related to the Constitutive 
Act of the AU and other international or treaty law issues.62 
Notably, the ACJHR jurisdictional grant as initially proposed, 
even without expansion, is far broader than that of the ECHR 
or the IACHR. Because Article 28(c) gives the ACJHR jurisdic-
tion over cases relating to “the interpretation and the applica-
tion of the African Charter, the Charter on the Rights and Wel-
fare of the Child, the Protocol to the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, or any 
other legal instrument relating to human rights, ratified by the 
States Parties concerned,” the ACJHR is the only court in the 
world that would be able to enforce violations of treaties like 
the ICCPR.63 Even under its original jurisdictional grant, ex-
perts worry that the court would suffer from an overextension 
of responsibilities.64
D. PROPOSED JURISDICTIONAL EXPANSION OF THE ACJHR 
 
Recent proposals have pushed for the jurisdictional expan-
sion of the ACJHR, a move that would challenge the bifurcated 
international justice paradigm outlined above that separates 
state- from individual-level accountability efforts. Proponents 
argue that in addition to the dual-chamber jurisdictional grant 
suggested in the ACJHR’s original underlying documents, the 
ACJHR should also include a third chamber to consider indi-
vidual-level criminal accountability for serious international 
crimes.65
 
 62. ACJHR Statute, supra note 
  
60, at arts. 17, 28. 
 63. ACJHR Statute, supra note 60, at art. 28(c) (emphasis added); see also 
Alejandro Lorite Escorihuela, Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law: 
The Politics of Distinction, 19 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 299, 381 n.305 (2010) (“The 
new [ACJHR’s] jurisdiction is set by Article 29 of the Statute in . . . incompa-
rably broader terms, at least with regard to the Court’s sister regional human 
rights courts in Europe and the Americas.”). 
 64. See Carlin Moore et al., International Legal Updates, 16 NO. 1 HUM. 
RTS. BRIEF 33, 37 (2008) (noting ACHPR Judge Fatsah Ouguergouz’s concerns 
that the merged court is ill-equipped to deal with its “impossibly broad” mis-
sion under the initial jurisdictional grant). 
 65. The merged court may be known as the African Court of Justice and 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, but for the purposes of this article, I refer to it as 
an expanded version of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
(ACJHR). See Don Deya, Africa: Is the African Court Worth the Wait, OPEN 
SOC’Y INITIATIVE FOR S. AFR. (Mar. 22, 2012), http://allafrica 
.com/stories/201203221081.html. 
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In February 2009, the AU Assembly issued a decision re-
questing the AU Commission and the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights to “examine the implications of the 
Court being empowered to try international crimes such as 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes” and to re-
port to the Assembly in 2010.66 In July 2010, the AU Assembly 
issued a second decision requesting the AU Commission to fi-
nalize its work on the implications of the jurisdictional expan-
sion.67 More recently, the AU Heads of State and Government 
meeting at the 17th AU Summit adopted a decision encourag-
ing “implementation of the Assembly’s Decisions on the 
[ACJHR] so that it is empowered to try serious international 
crimes committed on African soil.”68 As a result of these efforts, 
the AU released an amended draft ACJHR protocol in May 
2011 including proposed amendments, expressing formal sup-
port for the addition of an individual-level criminal chamber, 
and articulating a plethora of crimes—including but not limited 
to war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide—of 
which the chamber would be seized.69 In May 2012, African jus-
tice ministers and attorneys general approved the draft proto-
col for the extension of ACJHR jurisdiction to international 
criminal jurisdiction.70
 
 66. African Union, Decision on the Implementation of the Assembly Deci-
sion on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, at 1, Assem-
bly/AU/Dec.213(XII) (Feb. 1–3, 2009), available at http://www.au.int/en/sites/ 
default/files/ASSEMBLY_EN_1_3_FEBRUARY_2009_AUC_TWELFTH_ 
ORDINARY_SESSION_DECISIONS_DECLARATIONS_%20MESSAGE_ 
CONGRATULATIONS_MOTION.pdf. Shortly thereafter, the AU Assembly 
issued a second decision pushing for “early implementation” of the February 
2009 position. African Union, Decision on the Meeting of African States Par-
ties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), at 1, As-
sembly/AU/Dec.245(XIII) Rev. 1 (July 1–3, 2009) [hereinafter African Union 
Decision 245], available at http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ASSEMBL 
Y_EN_1_3_JULY_2009_AUC_THIRTEENTH_ORDINARY_SESSION_DECIS 
IONS_DECLARATIONS_%20MESSAGE_CONGRATULATIONS_MOTION_0
.pdf. 
 At the 19th AU Summit—hosted by 
 67. African Union, Decision on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal Ju-
risdiction, at 1, Assembly/AU/Dec.292(XV) (July 25–27, 2010), available at 
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ASSEMBLY_EN_25_27_July_2010_BCP_AS
SEMBLY_OF_THE_AFRICAN_UNION_Fifteenth_Ordinary_Session.pdf. 
 68. African Union, Decisions Adopted During the 17th African Union 
Summit (July 1, 2011), available at http://www.au.int/en/summit/sites/default/ 
files/17th%20_SUMMIT_-_DECISIONS_DECLARATIONS_and_RESOLUTIONS_-
_eng%20FINAL.pdf. 
 69. African Union, Legal/ACJHR-PAP/4(II)Rev.5, art. 14 (Nov. 13, 2011) 
[hereinafter First Draft Amended ACJHR Protocol] (on file with author). 
 70. African Union, Draft Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the 
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Ethiopia after initially planned host Malawi vowed to arrest 
Sudan President Omar Hassan al-Bashir pursuant to an ICC 
warrant if he attended the Summit71—the Assembly and the 
Executive Council requested further information on the finan-
cial and structural implications of expansion for consideration 
at the next summit in January 2013.72
Such a merged court—including chambers for treaty law, 
state-level international human rights violations, and individ-
ual-level criminal international human rights violations—
would radically restructure judicial human rights accountabil-
ity efforts in light of the bifurcated structure of current courts.
 Support for an expanded 
court may be growing, and aspects of its proposed operations 
are increasingly detailed.  
73 
Moreover, expanded ACJHR jurisdiction would overlap with 
that of the ICC to include serious international crimes, a move 
that could complicate already controversial international jus-
tice efforts.74
The history and evolution of international human rights 
courts reflect diligent efforts to increase accountability for hu-
man rights violations around the globe.
  
75 Jurisdictional expan-
sion could further these goals, constituting a natural (if revolu-
tionary) innovation in international law.76 Alternatively, 
expansion could undermine hard-won gains in the struggle 
against impunity for a variety of reasons rooted in law and pol-
icy.77
 
Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, art. 3, 
Exp/Min/IV/Rev.7 (May 15, 2011) [hereinafter Second Draft Amended ACJHR 
Protocol] (on file with author); Letter from African Civil Society and Interna-
tional Organizations to Foreign Ministers on the 19th African Union Summit 
(July 5, 2012), available at http://www.hrw.org/node/108800. 
 
 71. Malawi: Summit Meeting Declined, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2012, at A5. 
 72. African Union, Decision on the Protocol on Amendments to the Proto-
col on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, at 1, As-
sembly/AU/Dec.427(XIX) (July 15–16, 2012), available at http://www.au.int/en/ 
sites/default/files/Assembly%20AU%20Dec%20416-449%20%28XIX%29%20_E 
_Final.pdf. 
 73. See infra Part II.A.2.  
 74. See infra Part II.B. 
 75. See generally SIKKINK, supra note 10, at 1–28 (noting the emergence 
of justice norms after decades of efforts to increase accountability for human 
rights violations, especially following World War II); Sikkink, supra note 7, at 
121–22 (explaining that there has been a dramatic increase in international 
regulation through the ratification of human rights treaties). 
 76. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 77. See infra Part II.B. 
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II.  THE JURISDICTIONAL EXPANSION DEBATE   
ACJHR jurisdictional expansion, though not yet realized, is 
nonetheless a contentious issue.78
A. POTENTIALLY ATTRACTIVE ASPECTS OF EXPANSION 
 Such a development would 
potentially present benefits and drawbacks. In order to assess 
the desirability of expansion, critics must engage with both 
sides of the debate.  
Expansion presents various theoretical advantages. First, 
expansion may reflect the latest innovation in international 
human rights law.79 A brief historical analysis supports argu-
ments that such a development could continue an ongoing uni-
versal trend and, as such, novel legal advances in Africa should 
be both expected and welcomed.80 Second, the proposed expan-
sion would make the ACJHR the first and only international 
court to combine state- and individual-level proceedings for 
human rights abuses, a development that some observers be-
lieve would be both effective and efficient.81
1. Jurisprudential Innovation 
 Critics must con-
sider these points as well as possible practical challenges in or-
der to determine whether potential advantages would produce 
actual benefits. 
Jurisdictional expansion seems in many ways to reflect a 
natural development in international law. Historically, geo-
graphic and sociopolitical forces combine to shape human rights 
law in different ways at different times. Reference to the two 
most visible regional legal systems for human rights investiga-
tions and court proceedings, Europe and Latin America, is par-
 
 78. Compare Coal. for an Effective African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights [CEAC], et al., Implications of the African Court of Human and Peoples’ 
Rights Being Empowered to Try International Crimes Such as Genocide, 
Crimes Against Humanity, and War Crimes: An Opinion, AFR. CT. COAL. 3 
(June 2009) [hereinafter Implications], http://www.africancourtcoalition.org/ 
images/docs/submissions/opinion_african_court_extension_jurisdiction.pdf (de-
scribing the “insurmountable legal and practical obstacles” of expanding 
ACJHR jurisdiction), with Jacob Lilly, Peace with Justice: Options for Bring-
ing to Trial Human Rights Violators in Africa and a Proposed Solution to Cov-
er the Gap in Enforcement Mechanisms Between International Criminal Law 
and Human Rights Violations, 6 GONZ. J. INT’L L. 1, 30 (2002–03) (arguing 
that expansion would be “the most effective and efficient solution to dealing 
with human rights violators”). 
 79. See infra notes 82–94 and accompanying text. 
 80. See infra notes 82–94 and accompanying text. 
 81. Lilly, supra note 78, at 30–31. 
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ticularly instructive. Europe, rocked by the unimaginable scale 
of the Holocaust’s atrocities, effectively became a legal labora-
tory after the end of World War II.82 In addition to serving as 
the seat of the Nuremburg trials in 1945 and 1946, European 
states were among the strongest supporters of the 1948 Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights.83 Moreover, European 
states collaborated on the development of the European Con-
vention of Human Rights and its corresponding court in 1959.84 
Similarly, support for Latin America’s human rights commis-
sion and court in the 1970s and 1980s was a reaction to both 
large-scale human rights abuses and increased democratization 
across the region.85 Given this historical pattern in which legal 
metamorphosis follows a period of large-scale human rights 
abuse and/or the evolution of government, it may be natural to 
expect that Africa will serve as the next laboratory for judicial 
innovation unique to its own context. Indeed, this would not be 
the first example of African jurisprudential innovation related 
to human rights. The African Charter adopted in 1981, for ex-
ample, for the first time combined the three so-called “genera-
tions” of human rights law—civil and political rights; social, 
economic, and cultural rights; and a broad spectrum of self-
determination, collective, environmental, and communication 
rights—into a single binding instrument.86 Similarly, the 1977 
African Unity Convention on the Elimination of Mercenarism 
in Africa predated the U.N. Mercenary Convention by twelve 
years.87
Looking to other areas of international human rights law 
supports a position that the field of human rights is complex 
and perpetually changing. For example, contemporary scholars 
increasingly engage with the restorative aspects of human 
 
 
 82. Interview with Kathryn Sikkink, Professor of Political Science, Uni-
versity of Minnesota, in Minneapolis, Minn. (Dec. 14, 2011). 
 83. See GENE M. LYONS & JAMES MAYALL, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN THE 21ST CENTURY: PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF GROUPS 8 (2003) 
(noting that the specter of the Holocaust played a part in shaping the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights). 
 84. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 85. See Klaas Dykmann, Impunity and the Right to Truth in the Inter-
American System of Human Rights, 7 IBEROAMERICANA 45, 45 (2007) (“Latin 
America witnessed a practically institutionalised violation of human rights on 
a large scale. However, from the early 1980s, the beginning of democratic 
transition in the region led to an intense debate on impunity . . . .”). 
 86. Deya, supra note 65. 
 87. Deya, supra note 65.  
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rights court proceedings,88 the growing influence of the “new in-
ternational judiciary,”89 or mainstreaming gender-sensitive ap-
proaches in post-conflict rule of law initiatives.90 It is notewor-
thy that the jurisdiction of the ACJHR criminal section would 
include more crimes than are within the mandate of the Rome 
Statute.91 The expanded ACJHR could presumably prosecute 
individuals for crimes outside the purview of the ICC, such as 
corruption, trafficking, the illicit exploitation of natural re-
sources, money laundering and offenses committed by corpora-
tions; this fact suggests that the ACJHR could be seen as a bold 
judicial response to a growing body of international norms.92
In addition, it should be remembered that efforts to pro-
mote domestic (rather than ICC) authority over a particular 
case are not per se undesirable. Facilitating the development of 
domestic rule of law so that state-level courts are able to con-
duct investigations and prosecutions of crimes in the Rome 
Statute’s scope is a goal of many civil society organizations
 
Failing to acknowledge the dynamism of international human 
rights jurisprudence ignores its status as a living, evolving 
body of law.  
93 
(though not the ICC itself, given its judicial mandate).94
 
 88. See generally Thomas M. Antkowiak, An Emerging Mandate for Inter-
national Courts: Victim-Centered Remedies and Restorative Justice, 47 STAN. 
J. INT’L L. 279 (2011) (asserting that international courts are making progress 
towards restorative justice and that a victim-centered model is attainable). 
 Critics 
 89. Yuval Shany, No Longer a Weak Department of Power? Reflections on 
the Emergence of a New International Judiciary, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 73, 90 
(2009). 
 90. See generally Eve M. Grina, Note, Mainstreaming Gender in Rule of 
Law Initiatives in Post-Conflict Settings, 17 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 435, 
437 (2011) (arguing that cultural and religious gender issues are a significant 
inhibitor to the success of international human rights laws and asserting that 
“mainstreaming a gender approach in rule of law initiatives is crucial to long-
term success”). 
 91. Second Draft Amended ACJHR Protocol, supra note 70, at arts. 28A, 
46C. 
 92. Id.; see also supra note 72 and accompanying text; Escorihuela, supra 
note 63. 
 93. For a definition of “civil society organization,” see Charles R. Ostertag, 
Comment, We’re Starting to Share Well with Others: Cross-Border Giving Les-
sons from the Court of Justice of the European Union, 20 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 255, 255 n.1 (2011) (“‘Civil society organization’ is an umbrella term that 
includes nonprofit organizations, public charities, private foundations, and 
nongovernment organizations, among others.”). 
 94. Marieke Wierda, Stocktaking: Complementarity, ICTJ BRIEFING: THE 
ROME STATUTE REVIEW CONFERENCE 4 (2010), available at http://ictj.org/sites/ 
default/files/ICTJ-RSRC-Global-Complementarity-Briefing-2010-English.pdf; 
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cannot discount jurisdictional expansion of the ACJHR merely 
because it would produce a result different from the current re-
gime. International jurisprudence is both fluid and dynamic, 
meaning that novel developments in jurisdictional structure 
are not necessarily flaws. Rather, observers must closely ana-
lyze expansion in principle and practice to determine whether 
it would provide access to justice that is compliant with modern 
international standards. 
2. Revisiting the Bifurcated Human Rights Regime: 
Conceptual Advantages to Institutional Unification of State- 
and Individual-Level Proceedings and Practical Barriers 
Expanding ACJHR jurisdiction would overturn the 
longstanding bifurcation of state and individual accountability 
for human rights abuses detailed above.95 At present, the struc-
tural separation of state and individual mechanisms is a key 
element of accountability efforts for human rights abuses.96 
There is, however, significant conceptual overlap between the 
regimes.97
No court currently considers claims of human rights viola-
tions against both states and individuals.
  
98 This dual-prong 
system is indispensable to comprehensively addressing grave 
human rights violations.99 Either regime alone is insufficient to 
address the legal and social complexities produced by human 
rights violations.100
 
Christine Bjork & Juanita Goebertus, Note from the Field, Complementarity 
in Action: The Role of Civil Society and the ICC in Rule of Law Strengthening 
in Kenya, 14 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 205, 213 (“The reality is that the 
ICC does not have an explicit objective to actively participate in rule of law 
strengthening; not only does the Court lack an express mandate to carry out 
the functions of a development agency, but the States Parties are unlikely to 
finance such direct interventions . . . . [The ICC] should primarily defer to do-
mestic public and private actors to tailor their own rule of law strengthening 
programs.”). 
 If retaining both state- and individual-level 
 95. See supra Part I.A.  
 96. See supra Part I.A. 
 97. BONAFÈ, supra note 33, at 23–25. 
 98. See id. at 193 (“[O]ne of the clearest signs of the separation between 
state and individual responsibility for international crimes is that there are 
different and independent bodies charged with enforcing obligations of states 
and obligations of individuals under international law.”).  
 99. See Sikkink, supra note 7, at 125 (“[T]he addition of individual crimi-
nal accountability alongside of the existing state accountability model means 
that there is now significantly more enforcement of human rights norms than 
existed previously.”). 
 100. See BONAFÈ, supra note 33, at 23 (“[I]t is undeniable that the commis-
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accountability in the human rights law system is important, 
however, maintaining the institutional distinction between the-
se mechanisms may not be equally so.101
Some commentators suggest that the current bifurcated 
system is outdated and fails to adequately account for its con-
ceptual overlap. For example, commission of a war crime could 
produce responsibility at both an individual-level and a state-
level.
  
102 The current bifurcated system, then, produces uncer-
tainty about the interaction of regimes where such dual re-
sponsibility for a serious international crime is at issue. Critics 
further note that strict bifurcation cannot address the nuances 
of serious international crimes, such as those committed by col-
lective groups, rather than by individuals or the state.103
In all likelihood, however, the institutional separation be-
tween state- and individual-level proceedings remains im-
portant. In part, the distinction is significant because the fun-
damental goals of state and individual accountability will not 
always be complementary; indeed, at times they may work at 
cross-purposes.
  
104 Legal scholar Beatrice Bonafè notes the po-
tentially irreconcilable goals of the two mechanisms: state-level 
accountability is rooted in the doctrine of international legal 
order, while individual-level accountability stems from a tradi-
tion of imposing legal obligations upon persons.105
 
sion of international crimes entails a dual responsibility (of states and indi-
viduals).”). 
 State-level 
accountability efforts can “fill the gaps that assignment of indi-
vidual blame may leave in the processes of truth-telling and ac-
countability and thus may serve to further reconciliation and 
 101. Cf. id. at 194 (noting doubts about the “absolute separation between 
state and individual responsibility for international crimes as far as enforce-
ment mechanisms are concerned”). 
 102. Id. at 28 (“[A] dual responsibility for war crimes was, and still is, well-
established under international law . . . .”). 
 103. Id. at 67 (observing that the current bifurcated structure fails to deal 
adequately with collective crimes, i.e., those that are committed neither indi-
vidually, nor at the state level); cf. Jelena Subotic, Expanding the Scope of 
Post-Conflict Justice: Individual, State and Societal Responsibility for Mass 
Atrocity, 48 J. PEACE RES. 157, 159 (2011), available at http://jpr.sagepub.com/ 
content/48/2/157.full.pdf+html (discussing the insufficiency of both individual- 
and state-level accountability for mass crimes and calling for recognition of 
another level of accountability: societal responsibility). 
 104. See Jocelyn Courtney, Note, Enforced Disappearances in Colombia: A 
Plea for Synergy Between the Courts, 10 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 679, 680 (2010) 
(noting that the ICC, an individual accountability court, and the IACHR, a 
state accountability court, “fulfill different fundamental purposes”). 
 105. BONAFÈ, supra note 33, at 7. 
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peace, the ultimate goals of transitional justice.”106 Conversely, 
individual accountability personalizes the prosecution, convic-
tion, and sentences for human rights violations, lifting the 
“‘corporate veil’ of state responsibility.”107 The two approaches 
“are difficult to reconcile, and they lead to diverging solutions 
when applied to practical problems that arise from the rela-
tionship between state and individual responsibility.”108
Post-apartheid South Africa serves as an example in which 
post-conflict peace may not have been well-served by a dual-
purpose court. The African National Congress (ANC) came to 
power in South Africa in 1994 following the first election in 
which all citizens of South Africa, including blacks, were free to 
vote.
 
109 The formerly dominant and white-minority National 
Party (NP) had not been militarily defeated, nor had it been ex-
iled from South Africa. As a result, the ANC was not positioned 
to unilaterally structure the transfer of power or to pursue ac-
countability of the former government at a state level.110 Rath-
er, a negotiated transfer from the white NP to the ANC includ-
ed the creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
which established a framework that prioritized reconciliation 
and reconstruction by allowing for amnesties in limited situa-
tions.111
 
 106. Saira Mohamed, A Neglected Option: The Contributions of State Re-
sponsibility for Genocide to Transitional Justice, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 327, 331 
(2009). 
 The limited amnesty system meant that individual 
 107. Jutta Bertram-Nothnagel, Permanent Representative to the United 
Nations, Union Internationale des Avocats, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of 
the American Society of International Law (Mar. 25–28, 2009), in 103 AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 441 (2009). 
 108. BONAFÈ, supra note 33, at 7. 
 109. See generally LEONARD THOMPSON, A HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA 241–
77 (rev. ed. 1995) (describing the end of apartheid). 
 110. Paul Lansing & Julie C. King, South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission: The Conflict Between Individual Justice and National Healing in 
the Post-Apartheid Age, 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 753, 758–61 (1998). 
Moreover, a state-level trial was not available in South Africa in 1994 because 
no African regional court with the jurisdiction to conduct such proceedings 
was available. 
 111. Id. Successful constitutional negotiations depended on making a deal 
with the previous National Party regime, and Nuremberg-type individual tri-
als were not an option if the ANC sought to promote stability and reconcilia-
tion. Paul Lansing & Julie King Perry, Should Former Government Leaders be 
Subject to Prosecution After Their Term in Office? A Case of South African 
President P.W. Botha, 30 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 91, 98 (1999). Some observers ar-
gue that the use of limited amnesties and the consequent absence of wide-
spread individual criminal trials in South Africa promoted stability and recon-
struction. See John Dugard, Dealing with Crimes of a Past Regime: Is 
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criminal trials proceeded only where human rights abusers 
failed to apply for or obtain amnesty from designated amnesty 
committees.112 Had a dual-purpose court existed in South Africa 
in 1994, however, the determination to pursue this limited 
number of individual criminal trials in place of a more compre-
hensive (and more controversial) state-level proceeding could 
have sparked divisive political polemics, generated unrest, and 
fatally undermined reconciliation efforts. The case of South Af-
rica illustrates that the failure to maintain two unique systems 
risks confounding international justice efforts. If state- and in-
dividual-level prosecutions were unified in a single institution, 
decisions on the “track” that a particular case should follow 
would be affected by political considerations, dramatically af-
fecting the type and quality of relief available to victims. Ulti-
mately, the structural distinction between state- and individu-
al-level accountability preserves the integrity of the each 
system’s goals.113 An institutional separation facilitates contin-
uing efforts to serve the different and potentially inconsistent 
goals pursued by each mechanism.114
The current bifurcated system of accountability for human 
rights abuses undoubtedly reflects various flaws, but the pro-
posed ACJHR expansion is a remedy ill-suited to the problem. 
As the international legal community increasingly recognizes 
the overlap between the individual- and state-level regimes, it 
 
 
Still An Option?, 12 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 1001, 1010–11 (1999) (“Amnesty was 
one of the most difficult issues that faced negotiators after the abandonment of 
apartheid. Prosecution à la Nuremberg that had been threatened by the 
[ANC] while engaged in the armed struggle was clearly impossible in a situa-
tion in which there was no victor. On the other hand, absolute, unconditional 
amnesty, of the kind favoured by the retiring apartheid regime, was unac-
ceptable to the ANC. The compromise was conditional amnesty . . . .”); id. at 
1015 (“The present state of international law on the issue of amnesty is, to put 
it mildly, unsettled . . . . This uncertainty has a major advantage: it allows 
prosecutions to proceed where they will not impede peace, but at the same 
time permits societies to ‘trade’ amnesty for peace where there is no alterna-
tive.”). 
 112. Dugard, supra note 111, at 1012. 
 113. BONAFÈ, supra note 33, at 216–17 (“When no separation exists be-
tween the body charged to deal with state responsibility and that exercising 
criminal jurisdiction over the individuals responsible for international crimes, 
there is the risk that the basic principles of international criminal law may be 
frustrated . . . .”). 
 114. See Méndez, supra note 29, at 6 (“International criminal tribunals 
should never overstep their boundaries and condemn States for the abuses 
committed by individuals; likewise, organs whose jurisdiction is limited to 
State responsibility should not engage in determinations of liability of individ-
uals.”). 
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will have to conceptually revisit this bifurcation and collectively 
address the best means for imbuing the ICC with flexibility to 
adapt to changing opinions of the legal community and the 
evolving face of human rights violations. By merely patching 
together state and individual accountability into a single insti-
tution, however, the ACJHR’s proposed expansion would pro-
duce a jurisprudential hodgepodge, rather than streamlined 
justice. While individual- and state-level systems undoubtedly 
and necessarily interrelate, and while the current structure 
fails to recognize this interaction adequately, the goal should be 
to coordinate them rather than to merge them into a single in-
stitution.115
B. A CRITIQUE OF EXPANDED ACJHR JURISDICTION ROOTED IN 
LAW AND POLICY 
 
A comprehensive appreciation of the implications of ex-
panded jurisdiction requires consideration of legal hurdles and 
policy-based obstacles. First, the absence of statutory guidance 
in the Rome Statute or the ACJHR’s underlying documents 
means that interaction of overlapping courts would be difficult 
to articulate. Second, ACJHR expansion may frustrate the 
goals of complementarity painstakingly laid out in the Rome 
Statute: to promote state-level rule of law and to ensure that 
court decisions are not politicized. Finally, an expanded court 
might face myriad practical challenges to operating in compli-
ance with globally accepted legal standards.  
1. Treaty Interpretation and the Lack of Statutory Basis in 
the Rome Statute and the Protocol on the Statute of the 
ACJHR 
The most obvious challenge to facilitating interaction of the 
ICC and the jurisdictionally expanded ACJHR stems from the 
complete absence of statutory consideration of the courts’ po-
tential jurisdictional overlap. Given the absence of any binding 
text on the subject, the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties provides a helpful starting point to determine the 
ways in which the ICC and an expanded ACJHR might interact 
(or fail to do so effectively).116
 
 115. Courtney, supra note 
  
104, at 703 (noting that the goals of individual 
and state-level accountability mechanisms are both important, and that these 
institutions should develop “synergetic” relationships). 
 116. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].  
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Article 31 of the Vienna Convention states that a treaty 
must be interpreted “in good faith in accordance with the ordi-
nary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in light of its object and purpose.”117 The statutory 
language, then, provides a starting point. Unfortunately, the 
ACJHR’s underlying documents offer little clarity on the issue 
of complementarity. Indeed, the initial ACJHR protocol assert-
ed that the court “shall have jurisdiction over all cases and all 
legal disputes submitted to it” falling within several categories, 
declining to detail how concurrent or overlapping jurisdiction 
would affect the court’s authority to pursue investigations or 
cases also pending before the ICC.118 Recent developments fur-
ther suggest that ACJHR supporters have expressly avoided 
confronting the issue of overlapping jurisdiction with the ICC. 
The 2011 draft protocol incorporating proposed amendments 
would expressly limit ACJHR admissibility determinations, 
which relate to whether a case may be heard by the court at all, 
to only those situations where a “state” has commenced inves-
tigation.119 Moreover, the document specifies that “[the 
ACJHR], the Courts of African Regional Economic Communi-
ties as appropriate, and the national Courts of States Parties 
shall have concurrent jurisdiction over the crimes identified by 
this Protocol and Statute,” conspicuously omitting reference to 
the ICC.120 The 2012 proposed amendments to the ACJHR 
Statute again noticeably failed to address the relationship be-
tween an expanded ACJHR and the ICC by omitting reference 
to the latter in Article 46H on Complementary Jurisdiction, re-
sulting in an ongoing absence of clarity on the subject.121
Similarly, the ICC’s Rome Statute offers little clarity on 
whether or how the court’s complementarity principle would 
operate with a regional-level court.
 
122
 
 117. Id.  
 Both the preamble to the 
 118. ACJHR Protocol, supra note 6, at art. 28. Article 27 of the same proto-
col reminds the ACJHR to “bear in mind the complementarity it maintains 
with the African Commission and the African Committee of Experts,” but 
omits reference to the ICC. Id. at art. 27. 
 119. First Draft Amended ACJHR Protocol, supra note 69, at art. 46H(2). 
 120. Id., at art. 46H(1). 
 121. Second Draft Amended ACJHR Protocol, supra note 70, at art. 46(H) 
(“The jurisdiction of the Court shall be complementary to that of the National 
Courts, and to the Courts of the Regional Economic Communities where spe-
cifically provided for by the Communities.”). 
 122. Article 7 of the Genocide Convention provides that any person charged 
with genocide “shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the terri-
tory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal 
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Statute and Article 1 mention the court’s complementarity 
principle relative only to “national criminal jurisdictions.”123
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has 
jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely 
to carry out the investigation or prosecution; (b) The case has been 
investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State 
has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision 
resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to 
prosecute . . . .
 
Moreover, the court’s admissibility criteria relating to comple-
mentarity limit eligible cases to situations where: 
124
Had drafters of the Rome Statute contemplated its interac-
tion with an overlapping regional court, it is likely that the in-
strument would have expressed its jurisdictional scope with 
reference to regional as well as domestic mechanisms. There is 
little question that the Rome Statute intended the principle of 
complementarity to apply to domestic, rather than regional, 
courts.
  
125 In order to remedy that omission, states parties to the 
Rome Statute would likely have to initiate the cumbersome 
process of approving a statutory amendment that would expand 
the ICC’s complementarity principle to competent regional bod-
ies with individual criminal justice chambers.126 Of course, even 
in the absence of an actual amendment, the ICC Office of the 
Prosecutor could independently determine under Article 53 of 
the Rome Statute if the existence of a regional prosecution 
means that there is no “reasonable basis to proceed” with ICC 
prosecution.127
 
as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall 
have accepted its jurisdiction.” Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide, art. 6, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. An expanded 
ACJHR, though a regional court, could be interpreted as one such “interna-
tional penal tribunal” only by stretching the definition of that term far beyond 
its original intended scope. For a counterargument, see Chacha Bhoke 
Murungu, Towards a Criminal Chamber in the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights, 9 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1067, 1081 (2011). 
 Quite clearly, however, informal action on the 
 123. Rome Statute, supra note 22, at pmbl., art. 1.  
 124. Rome Statute, supra note 22, at art. 17. 
 125. See generally Wierda, supra note 94 (highlighting that the Rome Stat-
ute did not anticipate a role for regional courts to exercise criminal jurisdiction 
over crimes that could be tried at the ICC or at the domestic level and clarify-
ing that the Rome Statute assigns that responsibility to domestic legal sys-
tems). 
 126. Rome Statute, supra note 22, at art. 121(4) (“[A]n amendment shall 
enter into force for all States Parties one year after instruments of ratification 
or acceptance have been deposited with the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations by seven-eighths of them.”). 
 127. Rome Statute, supra note 22, at arts. 17, 53. That is, the OTP could 
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part of the OTP could invite suspicion of bias, and statutory 
texts of the ICC and the ACJHR are the most authoritative 
sources for recognition and discussion of overlapping criminal 
jurisdiction.  
That said, the absence of explicit engagement in the courts’ 
underlying statutes and protocols prompts consideration of un-
official, yet instructive, sources of guidance. Rome Statute 
drafters at no time considered that the complementarity regime 
they designed would apply to regional human rights courts con-
sidering cases of individual criminal accountability.128 Indeed, 
International Law Commission (ILC) commentary on a 1994 
draft of the Rome Statute reflects that the complementarity 
principle was intentionally limited in scope to national 
courts.129
Opponents of expansion worry that perpetrators of alleged 
human rights abuses in Africa could use this confusion to as-
sert jurisdiction over issues pending before the ICC, hoping to 
resituate investigations and cases in a nascent and under-
funded institution to avoid accountability.
  
130 For example, Arti-
cle 30 of the Vienna Convention suggests that where two suc-
cessive treaties relate to the same subject matter (as would be 
the case should the ACJHR’s underlying protocol and statute 
be properly amended to include a criminal chamber for serious 
international crimes), states parties to both treaties would be 
bound to their Rome Statute obligations “only to the extent that 
its provisions are compatible with those of the later treaty.”131
 
exercise its authority under Article 53 to apply the criteria of Article 17 to an 
evaluation of proceedings in a regional institution. Lutz Oette, The Repercus-
sions of the al-Bashir Case for International Criminal Justice in Africa and 
Beyond, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 345, 363 (2010). 
 
Efforts to strip the ICC of jurisdiction via this mechanism 
would likely prove ineffective; however under Article 127 of the 
 128. Sharon A. Williams & William A. Schabas, Article 17: Issues of Admis-
sibility, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIM-
INAL COURT: OBSERVERS’ NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 605, 613 (Otto 
Triffterer ed., 2d ed. 2008). 
 129. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-
sixth Session U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994), 
reprinted in [1997] Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 27, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/ 
1994/Add.1 (Part 2) (“The emphasis [in the Rome Statute] is thus on the court 
as a body which will complement existing national jurisdictions . . . .”). 
 130. See, e.g., AU Hostility Threatens International Justice, KENYAN SEC-
TION INT’L COMMISSION OF JURISTS (May 31, 2011), http://icj-kenya.org/index 
.php/media-centre/commentary/362-au-hostility-threatens-international-
justice [hereinafter AU Hostility].  
 131. Vienna Convention, supra note 116, at art. 30. 
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Rome Statute, a state party could not avoid its obligations re-
lated to cases or investigations commenced prior to the date of 
effective withdrawal from the Statute.132 Moreover, because the 
Security Council is empowered to refer situations to the ICC 
under Article 13(b), U.N. member states would be obligated to 
assist in the investigation of cases and the prosecution or trans-
fer of suspects, regardless of the states’ status as signatories or 
non-signatories to the Rome Statute.133
2. Frustration of the Purpose of Complementarity: Diverting 
Attention from Domestic Rule of Law Development and Risking 
Politicized Judgments 
 That is, African states 
that are U.N. members would be obligated to assist with ICC 
proceedings to some extent, irrespective of the responsibilities 
they assume by virtue of a new relationship with the ACJHR. 
Despite the ICC’s ability to retain investigations and cases cur-
rently underway, expansion opponents rightly note that the 
lack of statutory language creates ambiguity that could be op-
portunistically exploited to undermine ICC efforts and political 
support for the court. Moreover, confusion persists regarding 
the interaction of the courts with potentially overlapping juris-
diction in future, rather than ongoing, cases. 
Complementarity relates closely to the integrity of domes-
tic legal systems. Drafters of the Rome Statute considered it 
preferable to leave the majority of cases concerning interna-
tional crimes to national courts, which would likely have great-
er capacity to collect evidence and apprehend the accused.134 
Early Rome Statute supporters also saw rule of law promotion 
as a desirable (if secondary) effect of including the principle of 
complementarity.135
 
 132. Rome Statute, supra note 
 
22, at art. 127(1)–(2). Effective withdrawal 
requires a State Party to notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations in 
writing of its intended withdrawal, after which time withdrawal takes effect 
one year after the date of receipt of the notification unless the notification 
specifies a later date. 
 133. Rome Statute, supra note 22, at art. 13(b); see also Stephane Bourgon, 
Jurisdiction Ratione Loci, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY, supra note 35, at 559, 565 (“[W]hether or 
not the State on whose territory the crime was committed or the State of na-
tionality are Parties to the Statute has no bearing on the powers of the Securi-
ty Council under this provision.”). 
 134. CASSESE, supra note 34, at 351; Williams & Schabas, supra note 128, 
at 609. 
 135. Cf. Rosanna Lipscomb, Restructuring the ICC Framework to Advance 
Transitional Justice: A Search for a Permanent Solution in Sudan, 106 
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Domestic rule of law carries independent significance for a 
variety of reasons. Scholarly research reveals that rule of law is 
“strongly correlated” with life expectancy.136 Moreover, govern-
ment agencies have recognized the relationship between rule of 
law and economic growth.137 The ICC is not itself responsible—
and should not be—for actively developing the legal systems of 
states in which its investigations are ongoing.138 This responsi-
bility falls largely to civil society organizations and states 
themselves.139 The strong conceptual connection, however, re-
mains between the promotion of state-level rule of law and the 
ICC. If complementarity in part aims to promote the growth of 
national rule of law, diverting cases and resources to a regional 
court would serve different purposes. Development of regional 
rule of law at the expense of state rule of law may not produce 
positive effects in health and investment measures, because 
any effect would exist in a continent still governmentally divid-
ed into states. There is little support for the position that im-
proved regional rule of law would translate into better and 
more effective state policies, which is at least an ancillary goal 
of Rome Statute complementarity.140 Moreover, shifting the 
onus for rule of law from states to institutional bodies abdicates 
a responsibility fundamental to the international system, as 
“the exercise of national criminal jurisdiction is not only a right 
but also a duty of States.”141
 
COLUM. L. REV. 182, 183–84 (2006) (“Tracing developments from the Yugosla-
via and Rwanda tribunals, purely international in character, to the introduc-
tion of principles of complementarity in the ICC [on onwards] . . . an obvious 
trend emerges. Ultimately, the international community recognizes that there 
can be no substitute for serious efforts to strengthen the rule of law domesti-
cally.”). 
 Mere substitution of a regional 
 136. Peter Boettke & J. Robert Subrick, Rule of Law, Development, and 
Human Capabilities, 10 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 109, 117 (2003).  
 137. See, e.g., Safety Security and Accessible Justice: Putting Policy into 
Practice, DEPARTMENT FOR INT’L DEV. 14 (2002), http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/ 
SSAJ23.pdf.  
 138. See Wierda, supra note 94, at 4. 
 139. See id. For an interesting analysis of the paradox presented by the in-
volvement of civil society in promoting domestic judicial capacity as they advo-
cate for ICC involvement, see Bjork & Goebertus, supra note 94, at 205–29. 
 140. Bjork & Goebertus, supra note 94, at 212 (“The ICC Chief Prosecutor 
has stated that one of the objectives of his office is to encourage and facilitate 
states in investigating and prosecuting crimes domestically . . . .”). 
 141. Williams & Schabas, supra note 128, at 607 (quoting Office of the 
Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, Paper on Some Policy Issues Before 
the Office of the Prosecutor, INT’L CRIM. CT., 5 (Sept. 2003), http://www.icccpi 
.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Office+of+the+Prosecutor/Policies+an
d+Strategies/Paper+on+some+policy+issues+before+the+Office+of+the+Prosec
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court for a domestic court in the Rome Statute’s complementa-
rity scheme is not a solution to the problem discussed herein 
because it fails to account for the unique benefits of promoting 
domestic rule of law. 
Further, critics note that effective individual human rights 
prosecutions require a court to remain impartial, but they also 
demand that the court “understand the reality within which [it] 
work[s] to be relevant and effective.”142
Similarly, complementarity in practice is essential to 
avoiding politicized judgments and compromised judicial credi-
bility. Unlike the ECHR, which evolved alongside political or-
gans and entities in Europe, the expanded ACJHR is a “late-
comer to a scene with highly developed political organs.”
 Domestic tribunals are 
naturally exposed to this relevant contextual information. An 
expanded ACJHR, geographically and operationally distinct 
from the situs of the crimes it would consider, could result in 
remoteness undermining its effectiveness. 
143 
Because the ACJHR’s expansion would require a political deci-
sion by the AU, it takes little imagination to recognize that sub-
jecting a court to State determinations regarding its jurisdic-
tion “will have a very negative effect over its real or perceived 
independence and impartiality as a court of law.”144
In addition, given the lack of clarity regarding potential ju-
risdictional overlap should the ACJHR expand, conflict could 
easily erupt over which court—the ICC or the ACJHR—would 
have jurisdictional precedence in an investigation or case. Such 
a conflict has the potential to compromise the legitimacy of 
both courts by risking light sentences, weak enforcement, un-
warranted acquittals, or politicized benches.
  
145
 
utor.htm). 
 Even if the 
Rome Statute contemplated regional-level complementarity, 
exercises of overlapping jurisdiction could create conflict be-
tween institutions and produce proceedings that are actually 
 142. James L. Cavallaro & Stephanie Erin Brewer, Reevaluating Regional 
Human Rights Litigation in the Twenty-First Century: The Case of the Inter-
American Court, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 768, 770 (2008). 
 143. Thompson Bobby Ugiagbe, The African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights: Future Political and Jurisdictional Realities and Challenges, PEACE & 
CONFLICT MONITOR (May 3, 2010), http://www.monitor.upeace.org/archive 
.cfm?id_article=714. 
 144. Méndez, supra note 29, at 6. 
 145. Kate Gibson, An Uneasy Co-existence: The Relationship Between In-
ternationalised Criminal Courts and Their Domestic Counterparts, 9 INT’L 
CRIM. L. REV. 275, 277 (2009). 
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politicized or perceived as such. Moreover, overlapping jurisdic-
tion can produce uncertainty for victims, defendants, and pros-
ecutors of international crimes146 or result in forum-shopping by 
the accused.147 A lack of clarity about institutional interplay 
could thus seriously compromise the ACJHR’s ability to fulfill 
its expanded mandate (or its existing one).148
3. Practical Difficulties of Concurrently Operationalizing a 
Tri-Chamber Court  
  
While some argue that a court with jurisdiction over both 
states and individual actors could deliver a more comprehen-
sive package of justice,149 in reality the ACJHR likely lacks the 
fundamentals to execute an expansion and still deliver due pro-
cess because of inadequate capacity and political will.150
 
 146. There is some evidence that parallel judicial structures can result in 
double jeopardy prosecutions in violation of the ne bis in idem principle. ORG. 
FOR SEC. & CO-OPERATION IN EUR., Report 9—On the Administration of Jus-
tice, 7–8 (Mar. 2002) [hereinafter Report 9], available at http://www.osce.org/ 
kosovo/12561. For a discussion of ne bis in idem in international criminal law, 
see Ildikó Erdei, Cumulative Convictions in International Criminal Law: Re-
consideration of a Seemingly Settled Issue, 34 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 
317, 319–20 (2011) (“The principle of ne bis in idem is referred to in common 
law jurisdictions as the prohibition on double jeopardy. Double jeopardy is 
thought of as applying to repeated trials within the same jurisdiction, whereas 
ne bis in idem is broader, protecting ‘the person from repeated prosecution or 
punishment for the same conduct, irrespective of the prosecuting system.’” 
(quoting Arrila Bogdan, Cumulative Charges, Convictions and Sentencing at 
the Ad Hoc International Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 3 
MELB. J. INT’L L. 1, 4 n.17 (2002))). 
 First, 
 147. Gibson, supra note 145, at 276–77. 
 148. See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text. 
 149. Lilly, supra note 78, at 30–31. Supporters of expansion also assert that 
proceedings relating to African violations should be investigated and prosecut-
ed on the African continent. Harvard University Hauser Center, Domestic and 
Regional Complementarity, YOUTUBE (Apr. 15, 2010), http://www.youtube 
.com/watch?v=ifgXxa2Q1FI. This purely geographic argument is not convinc-
ing in the context of the ACJHR, however, because the ICC expressly provides 
for in situ proceedings (though these have yet to occur). Rome Statute, supra 
note 22, at art. 3(3).  
 150. See Implications, supra note 78, at 3 (noting that the proposal to ex-
pand ACJHR jurisdiction “confronts insurmountable legal and practical obsta-
cles”); see also Ibrahim Kane & Ahmed C. Motala, The Creation of a New Afri-
can Court of Justice and Human Rights, in THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN 
AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS: THE SYSTEM IN PRACTICE, 1986–2006, at 428 (Malcolm 
Evans & Rachel Murray eds., 2d ed. 2008) (“It would be a serious mistake for 
the Assembly to confer on the Court of Justice and Human Rights jurisdiction 
to conduct criminal trials, since the structure, composition and resources . . . 
would not permit it to conduct such trials. Furthermore, given that the Inter-
national Criminal Court (ICC) has been established and many AU Member 
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critics doubt the AU’s ability to design and implement an ex-
panded jurisdictional grant to the ACJHR, particularly because 
of its likely high cost and the limited resources already allotted 
to the court.151 Courts will require extensive training in the 
rights of victims, witness protection arrangements, compliance 
with court decisions, outreach efforts, evidence collection and 
preservation, and defendants’ rights.152 According to a coalition 
of NGOs and human rights advocates, the financial implica-
tions of these requirements will be “exponentially onerous and 
[will] call into question the desirability and effectiveness of the 
process.”153 African states themselves have noted the chilling 
effect that inadequate financial resources can have on justice 
efforts.154 Within the context of an expanded ACJHR, such a 
chilling effect is likely given the estimated average multi-
million dollar cost for a single trial of an international crime in 
an international tribunal.155
The effects of restricted funding may be amplified by ca-
pacity limitations. Jurisdictional expansion would require both 
administrative and structural changes to the ACJHR. With an 
expanded court must come detention facilities, a criminal ap-
peals chamber, and accommodations for inter-state actions re-
 Ultimately, funding limitations 
could seriously compromise the mandate of the ACJHR in its 
work relating to treaty interpretation and state-level human 
rights claims, not only that connected to individual criminal ac-
countability. 
 
States have ratified the Rome Statute establishing this Court, all attempts 
should be made to strengthen the ICC, instead of having a proliferation of 
criminal trials in different parts of the world.” (footnote omitted)). 
 151. Implications, supra note 78, at 16–17; see also AU Hostility, supra 
note 130 (describing a meeting of African and European civil society question-
ing the ACJHR’s technical and financial capacity to run a separate criminal 
jurisdiction outside of the ICC). 
 152. Implications, supra note 78, at 14–16. 
 153. Id. at 15. 
 154. See Lubuto v. Zambia, No. 390/1990, ¶ 5.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/55/D/ 
390/1990 /Rev.1 (1995) (asserting that country in a “bad economic situation,” 
such as Zambia, lacked the financial resources to adequately adjudge cases). 
 155. See David Wippman, The Costs of International Justice, 100 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 861, 862 n.11 (2006) (observing that, as of 2006, dividing the ICTY 
budget by the number of trials concluded indicates that $18 million dollars 
were spent per trial, though this figure failed to take into account the costs of 
proceedings against indicted but ultimately untried individuals or the costs of 
cases then in progress); M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: 
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION AND CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION 190 (2011) (reflect-
ing official website content from the ICTY and the ICTR that the average per 
case costs are $10–$11 million and $11 million, respectively). 
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lated to the apprehension and transfer of suspects.156 In addi-
tion, the ACJHR’s judicial bench would be entirely new if the 
sitting bench of the ACHPR is dismissed prior to ACJHR em-
paneling as planned; whether in its initially proposed or an ex-
panded form, the court risks loses valuable institutional 
memory that will need to be rebuilt.157 The capacity of AU 
states to meet these challenges is open to question given many 
members’ ongoing failure to ensure that independence and due 
process are guaranteed by their domestic courts.158 Indeed, 
ACHPR Judge Fasah Ouguergouz has noted the critical ab-
sence of respect for judicial culture at both the municipal and 
continental levels in Africa.159
Examples abound of insufficient political willingness in the 
AU and the consequent compromised effectiveness of AU hu-
man rights institutions.
 The financial resources and ca-
pacity of AU member states cast doubt on the likelihood of 
timely and lasting effectiveness from an expanded ACJHR; 
these doubts are further amplified given states’ willingness (or 
lack thereof) to consistently commit to efforts that protect hu-
man rights. 
160 The byzantine judicial maze of Afri-
can judicial accountability systems outlined above is complicat-
ed by delays related to the establishment and 
operationalization of the ACJ, the ACHPR, and the ACJHR. 
The ACHPR, for example, did not deliver its first judgment 
from its seat in the Tanzanian city of Arusha until December 
2009,161
 
 156. See Implications, supra note 
 and the ACJ has yet to hear any case. The ACJHR does 
78, at 18 (noting that an expanded 
ACJHR would have to rely on cooperation from states to enforce its orders and 
assist in investigations). 
 157. See Advocacy Before Regional Human Rights Bodies: A Cross-Regional 
Agenda, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 163, 244–45 (2009) [hereinafter Advocacy Confer-
ence] (noting comment of ACHPR Judge Fatsah Ouguergouz that “the judges 
of the current [ACHPR], the bench of the current Court, including myself, will 
be ‘resigned’—or, in other words, will be dismissed. So there will be a totally 
new court which is going to be established, creating some very important and 
crucial issues of judicial legacy”). 
 158. See, e.g., Abdoulaye Massalatchi, Niger Leader Dissolves Constitution-
al Court, REUTERS (June 29, 2009, 9:50 PM GMT), http://af.reuters.com/ 
article/nigerNews/idAFLT50531820090629. 
 159. Advocacy Conference, supra note 157, at 255 (“But what is missing [in 
Africa] is a ‘judicial’ culture, both at the continental level and at the grass-
roots, municipal level. There is no respect for judges at the national level. 
Most of the African states do not really consider the decisions or the rulings of 
the judges.”). 
 160. Kane & Motala, supra note 150, at 438–39. 
 161. Michelot Yogogombaye v. The Republic of Senegal, Application No. 
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not yet even functionally exist; as of September 2012, only five 
states have ratified its underlying protocol, notably short of the 
fifteen it requires to enter into force.162 Commentators have fur-
ther noted that the precipitate subsuming of the ACHPR with-
in the ACJHR “does not seem to bode well for the project of es-
tablishing a strong African human rights court.”163
Other examples of inadequate political will result from 
more explicit structural choices. For example, not all entities 
and individuals have access to the remedies that the ACJHR in 
its initial or its expanded form would offer. The most recent 
proposed amendments to the ACJHR, which would facilitate its 
jurisdictional expansion, reflect a notable limitation on those 
persons and entities eligible to submit cases to the Court. Ac-
cording to those changes,  
 
African individuals or African Non-Governmental Organizations with 
Observer Status with the African Union or its organs or institutions 
[are eligible to submit cases to the Court], but only with regard to a 
State that has made a Declaration accepting the competence of the 
Court to receive cases or applications submitted to it directly. . . .164
The significance of this language is that it severely limits 
the ability of individuals and many NGOs to submit complaints 
directly to the Court, because states that become ACJHR mem-
bers need not automatically subject themselves to individuals’ 
standing before the Court. By contrast, an important feature of 
jurisdiction in the ECHR, a predecessor and peer of the 
ACJHR, is the eligibility of individuals to submit complaints 
directly to the court for investigation.
  
165 Drafters of the 
ACJHR’s underlying documents, though presented with “an 
opportunity for remedying a critical failure,” declined to expand 
the limited grounds for standing before the court to include in-
dividuals.166
 
001/2008, African Court of Human Rights (2009).  
 One critic observes, “the limited standing [ob-
 162. List of Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the Protocol 
on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, AFRICAN UN-
ION, http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/documents/treaties/list/Protocol% 
20on%20Statute%20of%20the%20African%20Court%20of%20Justice%20and%
20HR.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2012). 
 163. See RUTH MACKENZIE ET AL., THE MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL 
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 408 (2d ed. 2009). 
 164. Second Draft Amended ACJHR Protocol, supra note 70, at art. 16. 
 165. Symposium, NGO Standing and Influence in Regional Human Rights 
Courts and Commissions, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 911, 916 (2011).  
 166. Simon M. Weldehaimanot, Unlocking the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights, 2 J. AFR. & INT’L L. 167, 177 (2009); see also African Union, 
Meeting of Government Experts and Ministers of Justice/Attorneys General on 
Legal Matters, art. 16(f), Exp/Min/IV/Rev.7 (2012) (on file with author). A full 
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structing individuals’ access to the court] was not an oversight 
on the part of African States but a calculated decision; and that 
it was repeated when an opportunity for revision appeared at-
tests to unwillingness of states.”167 African civil society organi-
zations have expressed concern that supporters advanced ju-
risdictional expansion with a political agenda, rather than a 
genuine impetus to promote accountability.168
That said, perhaps the most troubling reflection of inade-
quate political will for international accountability efforts is the 
discouraging record of African states’ compliance with already 
existing regional decisions at the state level.
 Indeed, it would 
seem that if AU leaders’ true goal is to promote accountability, 
efforts should be directed to strengthening the ICC, which has 
yet to issue its first judgment, and avoiding diversion of re-
sources to an unformed institution. 
169 While Africa is 
indeed a supporter of international justice—exemplified by the 
fact that African states constitute the largest regional block of 
ICC states parties170—African states have repeatedly failed to 
comply with regional human rights-related decisions. Indeed, 
observers estimate that the rate of states’ full compliance with 
AU Commission decisions is only fourteen percent.171
Examples of non-compliance with other regional and sub-
regional courts abound. In September 2009, Zimbabwe with-
drew from the regional Southern African Development Com-
munity tribunal, in an apparent attempt to halt the effect of a 
  
 
discussion of this aspect is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 167. Weldehaimanot, supra note 166, at 178. 
 168. Valentina Torricelli, The Contribution African States Can Make to the 
ICC Review Conference, in OXFORD TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE RESEARCH: DEBAT-
ING INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE IN AFRICA 30 (2010), available at http://www 
.fljs.org/uploads/documents/Justice_in_ Africa.pdf. 
 169. Cf. Cavallaro & Brewer, supra note 142, at 770 (“[I]n states where re-
spect for human rights is not entrenched, supranational tribunals are unlikely 
to enjoy the automatic implementation of their decisions, particularly when 
these decisions call for a significant political or financial commitment . . . .”). 
For a study explaining the difficulty of determining the exact rate of compli-
ance with African institutions, see Frans Viljoen & Lirette Louw, State Com-
pliance with the Recommendations of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, 1994–2004, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 32 (2007) (“[T]he attempt to 
chart compliance empirically and analytically is fraught with methodological 
difficulties. The most important of these is the [African] Commission’s failure 
to enunciate clear and specific remedies, leaving an unreliable yardstick for 
measuring compliance.”). 
 170. The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www 
.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2012). 
 171. Viljoen & Louw, supra note 169, at 1, 5. 
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court judgment.172 The Gambia has delayed compliance with 
the regional Economic Community of West African States 
Court of Justice ruling to investigate the disappearance of a 
journalist in 2006.173 According to a coalition of civil society or-
ganizations, Kenya and Uganda failed to comply with regional 
East African Community Court of Justice rulings in 2006 and 
2007.174 Several examples even reflect efforts to avoid account-
ability at the ICC. For example, after the ICC Office of the 
Prosecutor announced an investigation in 2005 into abuses in 
Sudan, the Sudanese government established the Special Crim-
inal Court for Events in Darfur (SCCD).175 The move was seen 
as “window dressing” and critics found that the court held “lit-
tle promise of bringing justice to victims of serious abuses.”176
The issue of jurisdictional expansion is marked by serious 
concerns relating to the ACJHR’s ability or the willingness of 
its members to pursue investigations, conduct trials, and en-
force judgments. Indeed, several aspects of an expanded court 
are compelling, and supporters’ arguments communicate legit-
imate points about the trajectory of international justice. Ulti-
mately, however, expanding the ACJHR’s jurisdiction as pro-
posed threatens to hamper both its effectiveness and that of the 
ICC. Determining a way forward requires critics to consider the 
potential legitimacy of expansion while ensuring that such a 
development would satisfy fair trial requirements. 
 
In effect, expansion of the ACJHR’s jurisdiction could continue 
to facilitate inaction by excluding key international actors from 
ensuring compliance with individual criminal accountability ef-
forts. 
 
 172. Paidamoyo Muzulu, SADC Mulling Measures to Take Against Zimba-
bwe, ZIM. INDEP. (May 13, 2011), http://allafrica.com/stories/201105140080 
.html. The case at issue was Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd & Anor v. Republic of 
Zimbabwe, Case No. SADCT: 2/07; see also Implications, supra note 78, at 19.  
 173. IFJ Calls on ECOWAS and Gambia to Enforce Court Ruling on Dis-
appearance of Journalist 3 Years On, INT’L FED’N JOURNALISTS (Apr. 9, 2009), 
http://africa.ifj.org/en/articles/ifj-calls-on-ecowas-and-gambia-to-enforce-court-
ruling-on-disappearance-of-journalist-3-years-on; see also Implications, supra 
note 78, at 19. 
 174. See Implications, supra note 78, at 19. 
 175. Joanne Mariner, Bringing Justice to Darfur, CNN (June 24, 2005), 
http://articles.cnn.com/ 2005-06-24/justice/mariner.darfur_1_janjaweed-darfur-
sudanese-government/3?_s=PM:LAW. 
 176. Sudan: Khartoum War Crimes Investigations Are Mere ‘Window Dress-
ing,’ HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 20, 2008), http://www.hrw.org/news/2008/10/ 
20/sudan-khartoum-war-crimes-investigations-are-mere-window-dressing. 
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III.  MOVING FORWARD: PROPOSED STEPS IF THE AU 
PURSUES ACJHR EXPANSION   
Despite the legal and policy-based concerns outlined above, 
resisting expansion of the ACJHR may be politically unpalata-
ble (if not impossible), and doing so potentially risks ignoring 
the legitimate purposes of such a development. Stakeholders 
should engage with proposals to expand the court at an early 
stage to ensure some level of input and guarantee that the ul-
timate result satisfies fair trial requirements. 
A. RESISTING EXPANSION MAY PROVE IMPOSSIBLE OR 
UNDESIRABLE 
Jurisdictional expansion of the ACJHR as proposed is like-
ly inadvisable due to the myriad legal and policy obstacles pre-
viously outlined. To now direct resources and expertise to a 
new institution would be to withhold crucial support for a blos-
soming and increasingly robust ICC. In addition, the ACJHR as 
initially proposed will likely have its hands full given the al-
ready unprecedented breadth of its jurisdictional scope.177
That said, resisting expansion might well prove impossible. 
While commentators have argued that AU opposition to the 
ICC should not be overstated,
 
178 it appears that African hostili-
ty to the ICC may be growing (or is at least more visible than in 
the past).179 Indeed, AU leaders have already shown interest in 
expanding the ACJHR’s jurisdiction, and political will may con-
tinue to further this agenda.180 Moreover, expansion may be de-
sirable at a theoretical level and because of what it reflects 
about the reality of developments in international law.181
Although reasons exist to resist expansion, attempts by 
rights groups and ICC proponents to resist expansion of the 
ACJHR may prove unsuccessful. To ensure that complementa-
 The 
historical trajectory of international legal jurisprudence sug-
gests that the current bifurcated system distinguishing state-
level from individual-level proceedings may well evolve.  
 
 177. See supra notes 63–64, 69, 92 and accompanying text. 
 178. See, e.g., Elise Keppler, Managing Setbacks for the International 
Criminal Court in Africa, 56 J. AFR. L. 1, 1–8 (2012). 
 179. See, e.g., African Union Decision 245, supra note 66 (asserting that 
AU member states need not “cooperate pursuant to the provisions of Article 98 
of the Rome Statute of the ICC relating to immunities, for the arrest and sur-
render of President Omar El Bashir of The Sudan”). 
 180. See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text. 
 181. See supra Part II.A.1. 
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rity endures, stakeholders should help develop key benchmarks 
against which the credibility and effectiveness of a new region-
al criminal-level court could be tested. 
B. RECOMMENDED BENCHMARKS FOR AN EXPANDED REGIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT IN AFRICA 
Calls to expand the ACJHR do not reflect the first or only 
efforts to develop extra-ICC judicial mechanisms for crimes 
within the mandate of the Rome Statute. Reference to past ex-
periences and analysis of stakeholders’ recommendations relat-
ing to fair trial requirements elsewhere is instructive. As else-
where, developing and applying key benchmarks can address 
potential challenges posed by the expansion of ACJHR jurisdic-
tion. Ultimately, many of these recommendations would apply, 
not only to proceedings of an expanded ACJHR, but to any trial 
of a person charged with a serious criminal offense. 
ACJHR criminal prosecutions would have to be generally 
credible in accordance with international standards.182 Indeed, 
prosecutions for serious crimes are not only mandated under 
international law, but are also meaningful for peace-building 
and stability in post-conflict states.183 U.N. principles for the 
protection and promotion of human rights state that a right to 
justice means both “prompt, thorough, independent and impar-
tial investigations” and “appropriate measures in respect of the 
perpetrators, particularly in the area of criminal justice, by en-
suring that those responsible for serious crimes under interna-
tional law are prosecuted, tried and duly punished.”184 The 
Rome Statute expressly asserts that non-ICC prosecutions 
must reflect a state’s ability and willingness to meaningfully 
prosecute a defendant for ICC jurists to consider them accepta-
ble domestic alternative proceedings.185
Quite reasonably, the ICC would likely place a similar 
  
 
 182. Benchmarks for Assessing Possible National Alternatives to Interna-
tional Criminal Court Cases Against LRA Leaders (May 2007), in BENCH-
MARKS FOR JUSTICE FOR SERIOUS CRIMES IN NORTHERN UGANDA: HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH MEMORANDA ON JUSTICE STANDARDS AND THE JUBA PEACE 
TALKS 3 (2008) [hereinafter Benchmarks], available at http://www.hrw.org/ 
legacy/pub/2008/ij/uganda_memos_cover.pdf. 
 183. Id. at 6. 
 184. Id. (quoting U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Human Rights Comm’n, Up-
dated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights 
through Action to Combat Impunity, princ. 19, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/ 
Add.1, 61st Sess. (Feb. 8, 2005) [hereinafter Impunity Principles]). 
 185. Id.; see generally Rome Statute, supra note 22, at art. 17. 
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onus on a regional court. The thresholds of willingness and 
ability entail both substantive and procedural requirements.186 
Procedurally, investigations and prosecutions must be both in-
dependent and impartial. Proceedings must not shield the ac-
cused from criminal responsibility and must be consistent with 
intent to bring a person to justice.187 Substantively, drafters 
should incorporate Rome Statute crime definitions and legal 
theories, such as command responsibility, into the law of the 
expanded court.188 Indeed, if an expanded ACJHR emerges with 
the flexibility to create its own rules and procedures—an origin 
far different from a more conventional situation of rule-of-law 
building in which existing domestic judicial systems are shaped 
to comply with international standards189—there is little basis 
to argue that its jurisdictional definitions should differ from 
those embedded in the Rome Statute. A failure to incorporate 
and apply Rome Statute definitions could result in a single de-
fendant’s simultaneous trials before the ICC and the expanded 
ACJHR with very similar (though not identical) charges, impli-
cating the principle of ne bis in idem.190 Similarly, the expanded 
ACJHR should expressly guarantee that the complementarity 
regime with the ICC would be fully respected.191
 
 186. Benchmarks, supra note 
 Such a move 
would assure opponents of expansion that the ACJHR was cre-
ated for a purpose greater than avoiding ICC accountability. 
182, at 6. 
 187. Rome Statute, supra note 22, at art. 17; Benchmarks, supra note 182, 
at 6. 
 188. See African Union, Report of the Meeting of Ministers of Justice 
and/or Attorneys General on Legal Matters 6 (May 14–15, 2012) (on file with 
author); cf. Benchmarks, supra note 182, at 6 (noting, in discussion of a poten-
tial alternative to ICC prosecution in the domestic Ugandan legal system, that 
the Rome Statute requires the substantive incorporation of crimes within its 
mandate into states parties’ internal law).  
 189. The principle of complementarity does not depend, however, on the 
incorporation of Rome Statute definitions into domestic law. For a case to be 
considered inadmissible before the ICC, a national prosecution must proceed 
against the same defendant for the same conduct, though the label applied to 
that crime may differ. See Nidal Nabil Jurdi, Some Lessons on Complementari-
ty for the International Criminal Court Review Conference, 34 S. AFR. Y.B. 
INT’L L. 28, 35–37 (2009), available at http:// ssrn.com/ abstract=1651851. 
 190. For a definition of this principle, see Erdei, supra note 146, at 319–20. 
See also Report 9, supra note 146, at 7–8 (discussing a situation where the ex-
istence of parallel legal structures resulted in a Kosovar Serb being twice in-
dicted and tried for an alleged murder).  
 191. Recommendations of the African and European Civil Society Seminar 
on Accountability and Justice, 11–12 April 2011—Pretoria, South Africa, INT’L 
FED. HUM. RTS., http://fidh.org/IMG/pdf/EU_Seminar_recommendations_ 
Summary_English_2.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2012). 
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Ultimately, the issue of credibility is particularly salient in the 
context of Africa, where a proliferation of judicial institutions 
has been accompanied by the continuation of egregious human 
rights violations. Supporters of an expanded court should 
acknowledge doubts over African leaders’ commitment to jus-
tice for serious international crimes and directly address such 
concerns. 
The observation of internationally recognized fair trial 
standards is closely related to the issue of credibility. The ex-
panded ACJHR should rigorously observe internationally rec-
ognized fair trial standards in principle and in practice. These 
standards are reflected in the ICCPR and include, but are not 
limited to, the right to freedom from torture and cruel, inhu-
man, or degrading treatment;192 the right to a presumption of 
innocence; the right to adequate time and facilities for prepara-
tion of a defense; the right to a trial without undue delay; the 
right to legal assistance; the right to an interpreter; and the 
right to refrain from self-incrimination.193 Particular attention 
should be paid to ensure the proper scope and adequacy of dis-
closure of material to the defense.194 The ACJHR should also 
provide for adequate investigative and prosecutorial capacity, 
implement witness protection and support procedures, develop 
a plan for victims’ participation and reparations, guarantee the 
security of court personnel and participants, and execute out-
reach programs across the continent.195
Perhaps most importantly, the expanded ACJHR should 
take steps to ensure that its judiciary is properly qualified. All 
too often, governments appoint judges to international tribu-
nals paying little attention to nominees’ criminal law creden-
tials.
 These elements are par-
ticularly important to ensure adequate involvement of the de-
fense, the prosecution, the judiciary, and the public—all vital 
parties in efforts to counter impunity. A failure to adequately 
assess and develop any component could jeopardize the integri-
ty of the whole.  
196
 
 192. ICCPR, supra note 
 Indeed, achieving the goal of a truly qualified judiciary 
30, at art. 7; Benchmarks, supra note 182, at 8. 
 193. ICCPR, supra note 30, at art. 14; Benchmarks, supra note 182, at 8. 
 194. Benchmarks, supra note 182, at 8. 
 195. Particular Challenges for Uganda in Conducting National Trials for 
Serious Crimes (Sept. 2007), in BENCHMARKS FOR JUSTICE FOR SERIOUS 
CRIMES IN NORTHERN UGANDA: HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH MEMORANDA ON JUS-
TICE STANDARDS AND THE JUBA PEACE TALKS, supra note 182, at 30–33 (2008) 
[hereinafter Particular Challenges]. 
 196. See RUTH MACKENZIE ET AL., SELECTING INTERNATIONAL JUDGES: 
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may be best served by maintaining the institutional bifurcation 
outlined above in detail. That is, the AU could proceed with the 
creation of a separate regional court concerned solely with indi-
vidual crimes, thus benefiting from the specialization in func-
tion and training such a court would attract, while maintaining 
the current dual-prong structure of the current and unexpand-
ed ACJHR. Meeting fair trial standards generally will demand 
the commitment of the judiciary and the broader public, alike. 
As noted above, the absence of a generalized respect for the ju-
diciary has already hampered accountability efforts across the 
continent.197 Undertaking broad efforts to raise the profile of re-
spect for judicial decisions in Africa will be crucial to operation-
alize fair trial standards. Ultimately, however, fair trials will 
require not only a legal system of high quality, but also that 
system’s independence from outside political forces.198
In addition, penalties applied through an expanded 
ACJHR should reflect the gravity of the serious international 
crimes in its mandate.
 This 
challenge may prove particularly onerous given the politically 
charged atmosphere in which the suggestion of jurisdictional 
expansion emerged. 
199 International law requires that states 
not only prosecute, but also punish, perpetrators of serious 
human rights abuses.200 The Convention Against Torture, for 
example, states that the crimes it concerns should be “punisha-
ble by appropriate penalties which take into account their 
grave nature.”201 U.N. principles on fighting impunity note that 
states should ensure that convicted perpetrators of serious 
crimes are “duly punished.”202
 
PRINCIPLE, PROCESS, AND POLITICS 173–74 (2010) (“It is apparent that efforts 
to insulate ICC elections from politicized electoral practices have largely 
failed, so that selection to both the ICJ and ICC is seen as being part of a 
broader landscape of political elections, often with very limited regard for the 
judicial nature of the posts.”). 
 Truth commissions and tradi-
tional justice mechanisms may well play an important role in 
post-conflict justice processes for some offenses, but an expand-
 197. See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
 198. Particular Challenges, supra note 195, at 29–30. 
 199. Benchmarks, supra note 182, at 9–10. 
 200. See Brad Emmons, Note, Tortured Language: “Individuals,” Corporate 
Liability, and the Torture Victim Protection Act, 96 MINN. L. REV. 675, 683 
(2011).  
 201. Benchmarks, supra note 182, at 16 (quoting Convention Against Tor-
ture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, at 
art. 4, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984)). 
 202. Impunity Principles, supra note 184, at princ. 1. 
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ed ACJHR should adhere to global standards and resist pres-
sures to implement these mechanisms exclusively. As in other 
international and hybrid international-national criminal 
courts, an expanded ACJHR should impose imprisonment as its 
principal penalty.203 International and hybrid international-
national institutions do not permit the death penalty as a sen-
tence for serious international crimes204 and, to meet interna-
tional fair trial standards, the expanded ACJHR should do the 
same. In addition, imposed and served periods of imprisonment 
should reflect the seriousness of crimes. International tribunals 
have consistently applied terms reflecting the gravity of the 
atrocities of which they are seized. A 2002 study concluded, for 
example, that the mean ICTY sentence was for 16 years’ im-
prisonment, while the majority of ICTR sentences were for life 
imprisonment.205
Finally, the expanded ACJHR should explicitly recognize 
that judicial determinations of ICC admissibility rest, under 
Article 19 of the Rome Statute, exclusively with ICC judges.
  
206 
That is, the ACJHR’s underlying documents should explicitly 
recognize that a determination of admissibility under the Rome 
Statute is not subject to attack on the grounds of competing 
ACJHR jurisdiction. Perhaps the best way to ensure the courts’ 
compatibility is to help guide an expanded ACJHR to work 
with—not against—ICC proceedings. For example, the AU 
could ensure that an expanded ACJHR adds value (rather than 
creates redundancy) by deploying it to execute proceedings 
against mid- and lower-level defendants where the ICC has 
commenced investigation and prosecutions against their supe-
rior counterparts.207
  CONCLUSION   
 That said, regardless of the way in which it 
is safeguarded, true complementarity must remain a pivotal el-
ement of the ICC. 
Somewhat compelling in theory, jurisdictional expansion of 
the ACJHR faces myriad legal and practical obstacles. Propo-
 
 203. Benchmarks, supra note 182, at 9. 
 204. Benchmarks, supra note 182, at 9. 
 205. Mark A. Drumbl & Kenneth S. Gallant, Sentencing Policies and Prac-
tices in the International Criminal Tribunals, 15 FED. SENT’G REP. 140, 142 
(2002). 
 206. See Rome Statute, supra note 22, at art. 19. 
 207. See Williams & Schabas, supra note 128, at 620 (noting that drafters 
intended the ICC to have a primary “emphasis” on senior leaders in any given 
situation under investigation). 
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nents of expansion should revisit the reasons asserted in sup-
port of including serious international crimes within the ambit 
of the ACJHR and recognize that such goals are better served 
by upholding the already-established ICC. Obfuscating juris-
dictional boundaries between institutions risks compromising 
the ICC’s substantial accomplishments and the ACJHR’s po-
tential to contribute to Africa’s international jurisprudential 
landscape. Ultimately, however, expansion of the ACJHR and 
its overlap with the ICC may be seen as both politically palata-
ble and the result of organically evolving international law. 
Should demands to expand jurisdiction become more insistent, 
stakeholders must develop benchmarks to preserve the integri-
ty of the ICC and ensure the legitimacy of the expanded 
ACJHR. Failing to do so would compromise the effectiveness 
and the credibility of both institutions, compromising hard-won 
advances in international human rights law. 
 
